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The People's Republic of China departed from past practice when it amended its bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) with Germany and the Netherlands to include the protections of national
treatment for foreign investors and comprehensive investor-state dispute resolution procedures.
Virtually all of China's other BITs contain a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause. MFN treatment
raises the level of substantive protection guaranteed by each of China's BITs to the level guaranteed
by its most protective, investor-friendly BIT International arbitral tribunals, however, have
reached conflicting results as to whether MFN treatment also applies to procedural protections.
This article suggests that it would be consistent with international investment policy and practice to
also allow procedural protections to receive MFN treatment. Such an approach is significant be-
cause it would extend the reach of the more favorable provisions found in China's recently amended
BITs to all investors whose states have entered into a BIT with China.
I. Introduction
The People's Republic of China (the PRC or China) has been called "a land and people
of contrasts."] China is something of a dichotomy as it "seeks to entice foreign trade and
investment with its sweet siren songs of economic benefits, while at the same time some-
what petulantly seeking to regulate the contact and the degree of influence. It is a country
where some of the banks' employees will work with an abacus while others will work with
a computer." 2 Indeed, many of the terms the Chinese use to describe their country and its
evolving economic, social, and political structures are seemingly oxymoronic or paradoxi-
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cal.3 An amendment to the Chinese Constitution in 1993 declared the new economic
system to be a "socialist market economy."4 The government has been labeled with such
uncertain terms as a "socialist democracy" or "socialism with Chinese characteristics."5 Its
history, size, population, and government combine to make China truly unique. Nobody
disagrees that China has been and continues to be "very much in transition," 6 but any
fears that foreign companies may have had about investing in China have always been
quickly allayed by the "entrepreneurial dreams and . . . alluring mysticism of doing busi-
ness" in China.7
As a "big player in the world's economy and a leading magnet for foreign direct invest-
ment,"8 China began entering into what one commentator calls "new generation" bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) in the late 1990s. 9 These treaties mark a departure from
China's long-standing reservations toward two provisions often included in BITs: 1) na-
tional treatment for foreign investors, i.e., foreign investors are treated no less favorably
than national investors, and 2) comprehensive investor-state dispute resolution proce-
dures.10 China amended its BITs with Germany in 2003 and the Netherlands in 2001-
two developed countries whose investors are likely to hale China into an arbitral tribunal
in the event of a dispute. The once onerous "procedural requirements imposed by the
treaties on anyone actually wanting to assert a claim against the Chinese state" have been
significantly relaxed.' 2 Indeed, the Sino-German and Sino-Dutch BITs represent a signif-
icant "breakthrough," 13 usher in "major innovations,"1 4 and "constitute a fundamental
change in the country's foreign economic policy.' 5
The focus of this article is China's acceptance of comprehensive investor-state dispute
settlement as it relates to "the principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment con-
tained in all Chinese BITs."' 6 "As the term indicates, the most-favored-nation standard
seeks to assure investors of one country treatment that is not less favorable than that
which the host State accords to nationals and companies of any other country."' 7 Dutch
and German investors now have the right to fully arbitrate substantive investor-state
claims against the PRC. This article addresses whether this right also extends to foreign
investors from other countries. For instance, there is a BIT between China and Kuwait
3. Pat K. Chew, Political Risks and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34
VA.J. INT'L L. 615, 634 (1994).
4. Jian Zhou, National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Studyfrom a Chinese Perspective,
10 ToURO INT'L L. REV. 39, 60 (2000).
5. Chew, supra note 3.
6. Id. at 630.
7. Id. at 623.
8. MichaelJ. Moser, Treaty Claims in China: Do China's BITs Have Teeth?, in DOING BUSiNESS IN CINA:
RESOLVING THE CHALLENGES IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT, 283, 283.
9. Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's
Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. L,,r'L & CoMp. L. 73, 76 (2007).
10. Id.
11. Moser, supra note 8, at 285-86; Schill, supra note 9, at 76.
12. Moser, supra note 8, at 285-86.
13. WENHUA SIIAN, T1lE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU-CHINA INVESTMENT RELATIONS: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 217 (2005).
14. Schill, supra note 9, at 77.
15. Id. at 76.
16. Id. at 100.
17. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL L N'VS-IMENT" TRFAIqES 65 (1995).
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that contains an MFN clause. Does a Kuwaiti investor, by virtue of an MFN clause con-
tained in the Sino-Kuwaiti BIT, now have the same procedural rights as its German and
Dutch counterparts to arbitrate substantive investor-state claims against the PRC?18 This
article addresses that question as it applies all investors whose states have entered into a
BIT with China.
Treatment of foreign investments and dispute settlement are two of the four different
substantive areas covered by BITs.S Perhaps due to the use of the common term "treat-
ment," there does not seem to be much controversy surrounding the idea of a foreign
investor being entitled to more favorable substantive protections extended to a third state
by virtue of an MFN clause, because "[t]he question of whether the beneficiary of an
MFN clause may invoke the more favorable substantive rights of a third-party treaty raises
little difficulty."20 In discussing the development of China's BIT practice, one commenta-
tor stated rather matter-nf-frctly that "by means of the M/N clause contained in the
Sino-British BIT, a U.K. investor can benefit from the more comprehensive national
treatment obligations contained in the 2003 Sino-German BIT."21 But whether those
same U.K. investors can benefit from the more comprehensive procedural protections con-
tained in the new Sino-German BIT is much less certain.
Whether an MFN clause entitles a foreign investor to invoke the dispute settlement
provisions of a third party's BIT with the host state has been of central importance in at
least five arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID);22 the tribunals have "reached sharply diver-
gent results."23 For purposes of this article, the two most important cases are Maffezini v.
Spain and Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria. Maffezini is the first decision "to address directly
the question of whether an MFN clause entitles a claimant to invoke dispute settlement
provisions from third-party treaties[,]" and the tribunal answered in the affirmative.24
The tribunal in Plama, on the other hand, "argn[ed] in favor of a presumptively narrow
interpretation of MFN clauses." 25
18. Moser, supra note 8, at 286-87.
19. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 17, at xii.
20. Emmanuel Gaillard, Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored-Nations Clause, 233 N.Y. L.J. 105
(2005).
21. Schill, supra note 9, at 100-01.
22. For an in-depth discussion of each case see Scott Vesel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence:
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 YALE J. INT'L
L. 125 (2007). The five decisions are: Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 396 (2000), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docd=DC565En&caseld=C163; Siemens A.G. v. Arg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowDoc&docld=DC508_En&caseld=C7; Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v.
Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M. 573 (2004), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC635_En&case
Id=C218; Plama Consortium v. Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M.721
(2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC52 lEn&caseld=C24; Gas Natural SDG v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of
the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction (2005), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.
pdf.
23. Vesel, supra note 22, at 126.
24. Id. at 156.
25. Id. at 173.
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Recognizing that each investment dispute must be resolved on a case-by-case basis,26
one may argue that the Maffezini rule should prevail, allowing foreign investors from
other countries that have concluded BITs with China to have access to the same dispute
settlement procedures China has granted Dutch and German investors for the following
reasons: 1) BITs and MFN treatment are based upon and designed to encourage competi-
tion in a global market economy; 2) substantive rights and procedural remedies are mutu-
ally dependent-each essentially becomes meaningless without the other; 3) because
China is inching ever-closer to a market economy, and assuming a dual role as both host
state (seeking additional foreign direct investment) and investor state (seeking to increase
protection for its national investors abroad), it has made a conscious decision to change its
BIT practice; and 4) the indirect investment provision of the Sino-German BIT is further
evidence of China's shift in policy to grant more favorable protections to more investors.
Principles of sovereignty and consent are therefore not violated, and the more favorable
treatment of China's new BITs should inure to the benefit of all investors whose countries
have concluded Chinese BITs containing MFN clauses.
II. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
Modern BITs are the descendants of early bilateral commercial treaties. 27 The United
States began concluding bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCNs)
as early as the eighteenth century.28 These FCNs "were primarily concerned with facili-
tating trade as opposed to regulating foreign investment."29 It was not until 1959, still in
the wake of World War II, that Germany and Pakistan concluded the first modem BIT.30
Unlike the previous commercial agreements that dealt primarily with trade, this treaty was
the first to deal exclusively with foreign investment.31
Just as modern BITs descended from bilateral agreements of trade and other commer-
cial relationships, modern MFN clauses are the progeny of age-old international eco-
nomic agreements-MFN clauses have been traced back to the eleventh century.32 MFN
treatment has been called the "cornerstone of international commercial transactions[,]" 33
and is included in most BITs. 34
When states enter a treaty containing an MFN clause, they "agree to accord each other
the same treatment they grant to any other nation" 35 such that "any favorable provision
provided for in a BIT will be available to every other country with which the host country
26. Id. at 127.
27. Jeswald W. Salcuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign
Investments in Developing Countries, 24 IN'L LAW. 655, 657 (1990).
28. Kennethj. Vandevelde, A BrieflHzstory ofInternational Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L
& POLY 157, 158 (2005).
29. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 17, at 10.
30. Salcuse, supra note 27, at 657.
31. Id.
32. Vesel, supra note 22, at 128-29; Gabriel Egli, Comment, Don't Get Bit: Addressing ICSID's Inconsistent
Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1045, 1065 (2007).
33. SHAN, supra note 13, at 150; Vesel, supra note 22, at 126.
34. SHAN, supra note 13, at 150; Vesel, supra note 22, at 126; DOLZER & STEVENS, snpra note 17, at 65;
Egli, supra note 32.
35. Vesel, supra note 22, at 126.
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has a BIT containing an MFN clause." 36 The end result is that the "host state will not
discriminate among foreign investments owned or controlled by investors of different na-
tionalities, "37 and the level of protection guaranteed by each BIT concluded by the host
state rises to the level guaranteed by that state's most protective BIT.3s MFN treatment
has the economic effect of leveling the playing field to allow foreign investors to compete
more fairly against one another in a given host country. 39 Without MFN treatment, states
would be allowed to play favorites and grant better protection to investors from State A
than to their competitors from State B. The host government would be able to create a
monopoly by essentially forcing State B's investors out of the market.
The kinds of competitive structures that MFN treatment ensures are at the core of
market economics. 40 Fostering competition is a part of the "market liberalization"
model, 41 and market liberalization is one of the goals of the BIT movement. 42 BITs are
viewed as "instruments of liberalizatinn." 43 Therefore, MFN clauses specifically, and the
BIT movement generally, represent the "victory of market ideology" 44 and international
investment law's choice to endorse and embrace capitalism and competition instead of
communism and government control of markets.
III. The People's Republic of China
In the thick of the Cold War, just over a month after the Soviet Union acquired its own
atomic bomb, Mao Zedong emerged victorious from the nearly quarter-century-long civil
war between Chinese nationalists and Chinese communists, and formed the People's Re-
public of China on October 1, 1949.45 "The new Chinese leader was a dedicated Marxist-
Leninist who was more than ready to defer to Stalin as the head of the international
communist movement."4 6
The dynamic between the Soviet Union and China, as well as China's stance toward
capitalism, changed significantly by the 1970s. Whereas "the Soviet Union and most
Eastern European countries refused to recognize" the European Community (EC) after it
36. Egli, supra note 32.
37. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 511 (1998).
38. Egli, supra note 32.
39. Gus VAN HARTEN, LNVESTMFNT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 43 n.163 ("A dynamic of
inter-state competition is written into investment treaties themselves through the standard of most favoured
nation treatment, which requires states to make their commitments under one investment treaty available
under others.").
40. Schill, supra note 9, at 98.
41. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 337, n. 118 (2007).
42. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L LJ. 67, 76 (2005). "The ideal of economic liberalism holds
that the market, not governmental laws and regulations, should determine economic decisions." Id. at 90.
43. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 504. "The basic premise of liberal economic theory is that free markets
will yield the most efficient use of resources and thus the greatest productivity." Id.
44. Vandevelde, supra note 28, at 177.
45. JOHN LEwVIs GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISrORY 35-37 (2005).
46. Id. at 37.
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was established in January 1958, China did not follow suit.47 Instead, it "developed posi-
tively close ties with the EC ...viewing [it] as a useful economic partner, a factor for
stability, and an irritant for the Soviet Union."48 Since at least 1979, when "China's atti-
tude towards foreign direct investment radically changed" with the announcement of its
"open-door policy,"49 the PRC, "in the middle of its transition from a planned socialist
economy to an unprecedented socialist market economy," 50 has had a delicate relationship
with international law.
On the one hand, Chinese concepts of international law were heavily influenced by
Marxism. "Thus, some Chinese interpreted the role and effect of international law
through class analysis transported from the domestic arena: Bourgeois international
law ...is mainly a weapon used by civilized states to control and oppress what they
consider to be uncivilized states."5' Western countries' international goals are considered
ideologically hegemonic and/or "under the control of multinational corporations who
search for super profits." 52 On the other hand, "Deng Xiaoping, the diminutive ... but
relentlessly pragmatic successor to Mao Zedong,... brushed aside communism's prohibi-
tions on free enterprise while encouraging the Chinese people to get rich."5 3 Thanks to
Deng's pragmatic approach of experimenting with capitalism and rejuvenating China's
study of and participation in international law,5 4 China's per capita income tripled, gross
domestic product quadrupled, and exports increased by a factor of ten between 1978 and
1994.55
That China walks a tightrope of sorts between communism and capitalism is also evi-
dent in its unique relationship with the United States. The United States and China
began BIT negotiations in mid-198356 but never came to an agreement owing in part to
the "Tiananmen incident" in 1989, after which initial negotiations were terminated. 57
The United States, however, is one of the largest investors in China even though there is
no BIT.58 The existence of a BIT is merely one of many variables that go into potential
investors' decisions. Many other factors such as China's size, location ("proximity to eco-
nomically growing East and Southeast Asian areas"), potential for low-cost quality labor,
abundant natural resources, and land space, make the PRC very appealing to investors.5 9
47. Zeng Huaqun, Promoting a New Bilateral Legal Framework for China-EU Economic Relations, 3 CHINESE
J. INT 'L L. 189, 191 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Schill, supra note 9, at 78-79.
50. Zhou, supra note 4, at 45.
51. Timothy A. Steinert, Note, If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, 2 J. CHINESE L. 405, 430 (1988) (internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 431 (internal quotations omitted).
53. Gaddis, supra note 45, at 197 (internal quotations omitted).
54. Steinert, supra note 51, at 431; Chew, supra note 3, at 633 ("Deng and other so-called pragmatists
generally favor economic modernization, reduction in and the restructuring of the national bureaucracy, and
increased internationalization including the encouragement of increased foreign investments.") (internal
quotes omitted).
55. GADDIS, supra note 45, at 215.
56. Steinert, supra note 51, at 432.
57. Schill, supra note 9, at 81.
58. Moser, supra note 8, at 287.
59. Chew, supra note 3, at 621.
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Entering into BITs carries with it a certain signaling function.60 A country signals that
it is trying to: 1) "promote foreign investment and ... increase the amount of capital and
associated technology flowing to [its] territor[y];" 61 2) "strengthen [its] relationship with
[developed] countries so as to obtain other benefits and favors, such as those in the domain
of trade or foreign aid, which such a strengthened relationship may yield;"62 3) "liberalize
[its] econom[y] and thereby promote economic growth;"63 4) "encourage[] domestic en-
trepreneurs, who might be skeptical of their government's intentions toward private capi-
tal, to undertake productive investments;" 64 and 5) "remedy the deficiencies in [its] own
governance institutions and in [its] own enforcement of the rule of law." 65
While there may not be a U.S.-China BIT, China is sending these signals:
In 1982 the PRC signed its first BIT with Sweden. Subsequently surging in number
to well over 110, BITs are now in existence with almost all capital-exporting countries
such as Germany, japan, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as with a large
number of developing and transition economies in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and
South America. 66
Furthermore, the PRC signed the ICSID Convention on February 9, 1990.67
China is sending all the right signals, and the United States and other western states are
getting the message. They view China's efforts to modernize its domestic and interna-
tional policies and legal structures as positive, progressive, and "proof that China is devel-
oping its market system."68 Nevertheless, several Chinese commentators urge Westerners
to be cautious not to jump to conclusions about China.69 Zhou warns that "corruption
and a lack of transparency hinder the establishment of an independent and impartial legal
system" and that sometimes businesspersons must "tender benefits to local government
officials in order to achieve a business goal." 70 Chew hints at the same corruption and lack
of transparency when she says, "In China, who one knows is as important as what one
knows, and what one knows may not be easily discernible. '71 Li does not mince words in
labeling, and almost dismissing, "the typical statement by the Chinese government" that
"[t]he whole purpose of China's economic reform is to transform the so-called planned
economy to a market economy" as "bureaucratic propaganda." 72 According to Li, "Chi-
nese economy, in its nature, is a power-oriented economy. Both the planned economy
and the market economy are only disguises to cover the power-oriented economy." 73
60. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 L. & Bus. REV. kM. 155, 158
(2007).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 159.
63. Id. at 160.
64. Id. at 161.
65. Id,
66. Schill supra note 9, at 81.
67. Id. at 89.
68. Chew, supra note 3, at 635-36.
69. Id. at 636.
70. Zhou, supra note 4, at 46.
71. Chew, supra note 3, at 623.
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From its Cold War origins in Marxism-Leninism to the current controversies of its
hybrid economy, the PRC occupies a unique position in the global era of international
investment.
IV. BITs, AFN Treatment and the PRC
Set against the background of the forces behind the BIT movement, the function of
MFN treatment within that movement, and China's ever-evolving role in the global econ-
omy, the issue of whether "pursuant to the most favored nation treatment, . . . foreign
investors from other countries that have entered into similar investment with China
should also enjoy the same [procedural dispute settlement] benefits provided by China to
Dutch and German investors" 74 no longer appears quite so controversial. If the Maffezini
v. Spain and Plama v. Bulgaria awards stand for the two possible outcomes (Maffezini-a
presumptively broad reading of MFN clauses and Plama-a presumptively narrow reading
of MFN clauses), a tribunal should adopt the broader, Maffezini-like standard, as pertain-
ing to the China's recent BITs, for at least four reasons: 1) BITs and MFN treatment are
based upon and designed to encourage competition in a global free market economy; 2)
substantive rights and procedural remedies are mutually dependent-each essentially be-
comes meaningless without the other; 3) because China is a) inching ever-closer to a mar-
ket economy and always seeking additional foreign direct investment and b) assuming a
dual role as both host state and investor state and seeking to increase protection for its
national investors abroad, it has made a conscientious decision to change its BIT practice;
and 4) the indirect investment provision of the Sino-German BIT is further evidence of
China's policy shift toward making more favorable protections available to a greater num-
ber of potential investors.
China's acceptance of comprehensive investor-state dispute settlement procedures and
inclusion of national treatment in its BITs with Germany and the Netherlands "constitute
[such] a fundamental change in the country's foreign economic policy," 75 that to deny
non-German, non-Dutch investors the more favorable provisions of China's most recent
BITs, a tribunal would have to ignore the underlying policies of the regime of interna-
tional investment law altogether. The PRC's BITs have slowly evolved since its first in
1982.76 The Sino-German and Sino-Dutch treaties finally "conform in all major aspects
to international standards," suggesting that "the PRC has come to terms with the widely
accepted standards in this field of international law," 77 which is to say that the PRC has
come to terms with capitalism and competition-driven markets, at least with respect to
international investment.
This change is especially evident in light of the fact that the new Chinese BITs grant
national treatment protection in addition to comprehensive dispute settlement proce-
dures.78 National treatment "is based on the presumption that there is a unified national
74. Moser, supra note 8, at 287.
75. Schill, supra note 9, at 76.
76. Id. at 113.
77. Id. at 113-14.
78. Axel Berger, German Development Institute, China's New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme:
Substance, Rational and Implications for International Investment Law Making 12 (2008), available at http://
www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/berger.pdf.
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market where nationals and foreign investors can compete and cooperate" 79-a notion
that, until the new BITs, was viewed as incompatible with China's planned economy.8o
As the Maffezini tribunal pointed out, "dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably
related to the protection of foreign investors."81 "From the point of view of foreign inves-
tors, the lack of fair dispute settlement mechanisms would render the discussion of [sub-
stantive protections] almost meaningless."8 2 Investors' "rights exist only to the extent that
they can be enforced through binding international arbitration" 3 and MFN treatment
should apply not only to the substantive rights granted in BITs, but also to the procedural
remedies.
China's new BITs should not be separated from the fact that China is no longer only an
importer of foreign capital, but now is an "emerging capital-exporter."8 4 As host states of
foreign direct investment gradually take on dual roles and also become home states of
outward-flowing capital, their motives change because their "desire to protect their own
investors gives [them] . . . an additional incentive to sign BITs."85 Because "restrictive
interpretations of MFN clauses will tend to benefit importers of capital, whereas expansive
interpretations will benefit exporters of capital ... a state's complex interests do not neces-
sarily map onto those of its investors."8 6 Thus China has to find a trade-off between her
motives as a capital-exporting country interested in a wide range of investment protection
for her investors' abroad, and her motives as a capital-importing country interested in
upholding state sovereignty and regulatory leeway as far as possible.87 China's new BITs
with the Netherlands and Germany represent "China's deliberate choice to include
broader rights for foreign investors."88
Furthermore, an innovation in the 2003 Sino-German BIT covers "indirect" invest-
ments. Even if a tribunal were to find that it lacked jurisdiction over the investor-state
arbitration of a substantive claim between a non-German, non-Dutch investor and the
PRC, the indirect investment provision protects "holding constructions where the invest-
ment is not directly held by the mother company but effectuated via one or several subsid-
iaries."8 9 This allows "corporate structuring via third-country subsidiaries in order to
bring an investment under the protection of international law in case no BIT exists be-
tween the investor's home State and the PRC."9° U.S. investors, for instance, who do not
enjoy the benefits of a Sino-American BIT, may run an investment through a subsidiary
incorporated in Germany and enjoy the very favorable protections of the Sino-German
BIT.91
79. SHAN, supra note 13, at 163.
80. Id.
81. Vesel, supra note 22, at 158.
82. Steinert, supra note 51, at 452.
83. Vesel, supra note 22, at 158.
84. Schill, supra note 9, at 99.
85. Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement and Realiza-
tion, in TRANSNATIONAL CoRPoRATroN AND HumA, RIGHTS, at 80-81 (ed. Olivier De Schutter) (2006).
86. Vesel, supra note 22, at 132-33.
87. Schill, supra note 9, at 115-16.
88. Id. at 114-15.
89. Id. at 85.
90. Id. at 86.
91. Id.
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By its explicit consent to this indirect investment provision which allows investors to
benefit from BIT protection without having a BIT or an MFN clause at all, China implic-
itly consents to a broad interpretation of its MFN clauses with respect to dispute settle-
ment procedures. It would be paradoxical to apply the restrictive Plama-like reading of
MFN protection and preclude those investors of third-party states, who have at least en-
tered into an "old generation" BIT with China, from benefiting from the "new genera-
tion" BITs while simultaneously permitting investors from states with no legal investment
relationship with China whatsoever to suddenly acquire substantive rights and procedural
remedies vis-i-vis China simply by engaging in relatively straightforward corporate
restructuring.
V. Conclusion
China's new BITs mark a substantial departure from its past BIT practice. The new
provisions-national treatment, comprehensive investor-state arbitration, and indirect in-
vestment protection-level the playing field and are evidence of a huge step in the direc-
tion of the economic system at the heart of international investment law: capitalism.
While China may feel weakened and more vulnerable to arbitration by consenting to
comprehensive dispute resolution procedures, it is a classic example of a state yielding a
portion of its sovereignty in order to "promot[e] aggregate gain to the public good
through the type of broad cross-border investment fostered by arbitration."92
China knows that MFN clauses function like a "one-way ratchet" such that "[riather
than renegotiating a large number of BITs to incorporate [a] change, a host state can
simply agree to a single BIT with the more favorable provision with the knowledge that by
operation of the MFN clauses, the new treatment will apply to investors from any country
with a BIT."93 By renegotiating its BITs with the Netherlands and Germany, China has
done precisely that. It agreed to more favorable provisions knowing that Dutch and Ger-
man investors would not have a monopoly on the benefits of these investor-friendly
changes. Rather, investors from any other country with which China has a BIT should
also benefit.
92. Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J.
]NT'L L. 365, 399 (2003).
93. Vesel, supra note 22, at 142-43 (emphasis added).
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